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worked for him, and all indications are
that he demanded the same of himself.
One comes away from this biography
with an appreciation for Rickover’s ac-
complishments in the Navy but with no
understanding of the man. Rickover cer-
tainly left an enduring and immensely
valuable legacy, but Duncan should have
been fully open and fair, reporting all the
pertinent aspects of his life. A biography
should neither unduly venerate nor un-
justly condemn. Duncan comes peril-
ously close to writing a hagiography.
Most readers would have much preferred
honesty and a more complete depiction
of the complex human being Hyman
Rickover was.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
Ring, Jim. We Come Unseen. London: John Murray,
2001. 270pp. £20
Books about submarines are generally
disapproved of, unless they are technical
volumes describing the characteristics
and performance of potentially hostile
fleets. A couple of recent accounts of
American operations have run into shal-
low water. For example, Roger Dunham
was obliged to censor much of his Spy
Sub (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and
conceal the fact that he had served on the
USS Halibut on classified projects, one of
which was the discovery of the wreck of a
Soviet submarine in the Pacific. Exer-
cising discretion, Dunham called his boat
Viperfish and never identified the K-219,
the Soviet Golf II that went down in 1968
with ballistic missiles aboard and became
the target of a celebrated CIA salvage op-
eration, code-named JENNIFER.
Two years later, Dunham’s efforts to
comply with the demands of the U.S.
Navy to protect Halibut proved counter-
productive when Sherry Sontag, Christo-
pher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew
published their best-selling Blind Man’s
Bluff: The Untold Story of American Sub-
marine Espionage (PublicAffairs, 1998).
Their detailed description of the eaves-
dropping and other secret operations
conducted by Halibut over many years
had clearly been informed by inside
sources. Finally, John Pina Craven, for-
merly the chief scientist with the U.S.
Navy’s Special Projects program, released
The Silent War: The Cold War Battle be-
neath the Sea (Simon & Schuster, 2001),
giving more details of Halibut’s activities
and providing his own astonishing expla-
nation of the loss of the K-219. According
to Craven, the Soviet submarine’s com-
mander had been preparing for a rogue
missile launch aimed at Hawaii when his
vessel sustained a sudden, catastrophic ac-
cident that sent it plunging to the sea floor.
Until recently, such disclosures have
been uniquely American, with almost
nothing released in England about the
Royal Navy’s nuclear partnership with its
U.S. cousins or about its contributions
to the clandestine combat fought in the
Arctic against the “boomers” (ballistic-
missile submarines) of the Red Banner
Northern Fleet. That silence has now
been broken by Jim Ring, who marks the
British submarine service’s centenary
with remarkable revelations about the
cat-and-mouse games played off
Murmansk, the extraordinary phenome-
non of “ice damage” (a euphemism for
underwater collision), as well as the de-
ployment of hunter-killer submarines to
the South Atlantic in 1982 during the
Falklands War.
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Possessing a relatively small fleet of sub-
marines, at least in comparison to the
United States, Britain requires its boats
to fulfill several different roles. The
smaller diesel-electrics are equipped to
support teams of the Special Boat Squad-
ron (SBS), who train continuously to
perfect their covert infiltration skills and
develop new techniques to counter terror-
ists and drug smugglers. The Poseidon-
armed deterrent force undertakes long
patrols and generally avoids surfacing so
as to maintain a credible threat to a po-
tential aggressor. For the hunter-killers,
the task has been to shadow potential tar-
gets, raise antennas in dangerous waters
to collect signals intelligence, and occa-
sionally make goodwill visits to carefully
selected ports to reinforce diplomatic
messages.
Thus a courtesy invitation in Rio de
Janeiro to the Argentine naval attaché to
come aboard and enjoy a drink had a
very specific objective; it certainly made
clear the wisdom of not attempting to
mount any amphibious landings on dis-
puted territories in the region. This use-
ful exercise was executed with total
success in 1977, when HMS Dread-
nought participated in Operation JOUR-
NEYMAN, now regarded as a classic of
deterrence. Unfortunately there was no
time to repeat it in 1982 before General
Leopoldo Galtieri seized the opportu-
nity to launch a surprise invasion of the
Falklands.
While much has been published con-
cerning the Falklands War, two aspects
have remained under wraps. First, there
is the vexed question of what nuclear
munitions were temporarily lost when
the destroyer Coventry and the frigates
Antelope and Ardent were sunk by Ar-
gentine aircraft in San Carlos Water.
Such issues are never debated in public
in Britain, although reports have circu-
lated of specialist divers engaged in the
recovery of atomic depth charges. The
second aspect, usually touched upon
only when HMS Conqueror is referred to
as the submarine responsible for sinking
the cruiser General Belgrano, concerns
the mission of that submarine and the
other four attack boats that played un-
seen roles in the conflict. Where were
Valiant, Spartan, and Splendid? They too
were making a vital contribution, moni-
toring enemy aircraft from the Argen-
tine mainland and giving valuable
two-hour warnings of air raids. As for
the diesel-powered Onyx, which took a
month to reach the Total Exclusion
Zone, its plan was to drop a team of SBS
saboteurs near Rio Grande, the base
from which the Exocet-equipped Super
Etendards had flown to sink HMS Shef-
field, the first major British casualty of
the war. In the end, however, Operation
MIKADO was handed over to the Special
Air Service, which planned to crash-land
two C-130s on the runway and then
have the raiders escape to Chile. The
idea was abandoned as suicidal.
The Falklands conflict provided plenty of
firsts. General Belgrano was the first en-
emy ship sunk by a British submarine
since the end of the Second World War;
the sinking (with old Mark 8 torpedoes,
in preference to the wire-guided Tiger-
fish) was a turning point in the war, ef-
fectively bottling up the entire Argentine
navy in port. Valiant was at sea a record
101 days, and the jettisoning of unex-
pended ordnance upon it by Argentine
aircraft returning to their base amounted
to the first (unintentional) air attack on
any nuclear submarine. The submarines’
warnings of Argentine sorties, sent from
dangerously shallow water to the task
force, took just two minutes to reach
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their destination with the aid of a satellite
link. The early warning provided by the
submarines saved many lives and was
critical in giving air superiority to the
British liberators of the islands. The Ar-
gentine air raids were countered by
short-legged but deadly Sea Harriers
armed with the latest Sidewinders, which
proved to be impressive weapons.
Doubtless there is more to be revealed
about the adventures of a handful of
British submarine officers who survived
the notoriously demanding “Perisher”
command course to play tag with their
Soviet opponents and fight the Argentine
junta. Who could have foreseen a subma-
rine service playing such a role?
NIGEL WEST
European editor of the World Intelligence Review and
editorial director of Saint Ermin’s Press
Berks, England
Harris, Brayton. The Navy Times Book of Subma-
rines: A Political, Social and Military History. New
York: Berkley Books, 1997. 398pp. $15
This historical book is a compilation of
thousands of facts surrounding the evo-
lutionary development of today’s mod-
ern submarine. In an effort to separate
fiction from fact, Captain Harris (U.S.
Navy, Ret.) debunks many commonly
held myths that have been perpetuated in
submarine lore.
With twenty-four years of active duty
service, Harris is well suited to speak on
these matters. The huge number of facts
interlaced throughout this work is evi-
dence in itself of the thoroughness of his
research. Harris has also written The Age
of the Battleship, 1890–1922, and a study
of the role of the newspaper during the
American Civil War that appeared in the
magazine of the Civil War Society, Civil
War. He has written for the Saturday
Review and the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings.
This book begins with the late sixteenth
century. Little-known names like Wil-
liam Bourne, Frederico Gianibelli, and
Cornelius Drebbel are joined by that of
Robert Boyle (formulator of Boyle’s Law)
in the development of submarine craft.
While Gianibelli carried out the first suc-
cessful wartime assault using submerged
explosives, Drebbel is credited with the
first craft capable of transporting men
and equipment underwater. Here begins
Harris’s correction of folklore. Drebbel’s
craft, rowed by twelve strong men, did
not actually operate submerged, but
awash. The boat’s submerged operations
became such a fish story that a hundred
years after the event, it was claimed that
King James I himself had ventured un-
derwater in Drebbel’s craft. Harris puts
the matter right.
Harris points out two issues that plague
military inventors. First, wars create ne-
cessity; without the threat of war, there
is no drive to create new technology.
Second, bureaucratic inertia is extremely
difficult to overcome. Interest in these
“infernal machines” would wax and
wane depending upon the state of politi-
cal and military unrest. Inventors and
capitalists had to become politicians to
find support within their governments;
it required the patience of Job to wait
for a bureaucrat to provide the neces-
sary financial backing.
This work is more than a history of the
mechanical evolution of submarines; it
also discusses the legal matters surround-
ing naval warfare. Harris tells how Con-
federate president Jefferson Davis
invited ordinary citizens to become pri-
vateers, including (and especially)
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